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Nothing is as practical as a good theory (Lewin, 1945, p. 129). 
1. Introduction  
For many researchers, the development of theory within their disciplines is the central goal (the 
“jewel in the crown”) of their research endeavors (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989 ; Lewin, 1945; Parsons, 
1950; Shapira, 2011). By articulating high-quality theory, they believe they are more likely to 
enhance their own knowledge of and other scholars’ knowledge of the domain covered by their 
theory. Some also believe they can enhance practitioners’ capabilities to operate effectively and 
efficiently in the domain covered by their theory. For these reasons, scholars in a number of 
disciplines have, from time to time, sought to articulate the nature of and characteristics of high-
quality theory (e.g., Blalock, 1971; Dubin, 1978; Fetzer, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Van de Ven, 
1989; Weick, 1995, 1999; Whetten, 1989). 
 
In spite of the importance that many researchers ascribe to theory, the development of new theory 
and the refinement of existing theories have been relatively neglected features of research within the 
information systems discipline. As a result, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, several editors of major 
information systems journals appealed for more theoretical contributions to be made to the discipline 
(e.g., Webster & Watson, 2002; Zmud, 1998). 
 
To date, only a relatively small number of papers have been published within the information systems 
discipline that researchers might use to guide their development of new, high-quality theories and 
their refinement of existing theories (e.g., Gregor, 2006; Grover, Lyytinen, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2008; 
Markus & Robey, 1988). Moreover, even if information systems researchers were to seek guidance 
from other disciplines where attention to theory building has had a longer history, the processes they 
might use to develop and refine theories remain an arcane affair (e.g., Dubin, 1978; Freese, 1980; 
Sutton & Staw, 1995). 
 
In this paper, I propose a framework and criteria that can be used to evaluate the quality of a theory. 
While my framework and criteria build on the work of many other scholars (e.g., see the references 
above), I believe my contribution is novel in its reliance on a theory of ontology to provide more formal 
and precise foundations for the evaluation of theory. I show how the framework and criteria I 
articulate can be employed to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of an existing theory within the 
information systems discipline – one that, according to citation evidence, has had a significant impact 
on many researchers within the discipline. 
 
I focus on providing a framework and criteria for theory evaluation for four reasons. First, I seek to 
provide a means of identifying the likely usefulness of a theory as a basis for predicting and/or 
explaining real-world phenomena. Second, I wish to provide a way of pinpointing areas where 
empirical tests of the theory are likely to be problematic. Third, I seek to provide a method of 
identifying opportunities for refining a theory. Fourth, I wish to provide guidance in relation to the 
development of new, high-quality theory. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follow. First, I briefly define some ontological constructs that enable 
me to define the meaning I ascribe to the term “theory” and to articulate the framework and criteria I 
propose for evaluating the quality of a theory more precisely. Second, I explain the meaning I ascribe 
to the term “theory”. Third, I describe the framework and criteria that I propose for evaluating the 
quality of a theory. Fourth, I attempt to show the usefulness of the framework and criteria by applying 
them to the evaluation of an important, extant information systems theory. Fifth, I canvass how the 
framework and criteria can be used to inform the refinement of existing theories and the development 
of new, high-quality theories. Finally, I provide some reflections and conclusions. 
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2. Some Basic Ontology 
Theories provide a representation of someone’s perceptions of how a subset of real-world phenomena 
should be described. In this light, they can be conceived as specialized ontologies – instances of a 
general ontology (a theory about the nature of and makeup of the real world, in general). For this 
reason, I argue that any careful analysis of the notion of and components of a theory has to be rooted in 
a rigorously formulated generalized ontology. The elements of a specific theory can then be evaluated 
in terms of how well they map to or instantiate this generalized ontology. 
 
In the sections below, I have used a formal, generalized ontology proposed by Bunge (1977, 1979) as 
the basis for my analyses. His ontology seeks to “stake out the main traits of the real world…in a 
clear and systematic way…to produce a unified picture of reality” (Bunge 1977, p. 5). I have chosen 
Bunge’s ontology for two reasons: (a) it is the most rigorously formulated ontology that I have 
discovered; and (b) I have found it to be useful in elucidating ideas about theory that, in my view, 
have long remained vague and imprecise. Table 1 provides a succinct (and somewhat informal) 
explanation of some key constructs in Bunge’s ontology. 
 
Table 1. Some Fundamental Ontological Constructs 
Construct Explanation 
Thing 
The world is made of things. Things can be substantial or concrete (e.g., an information system user 
or a computer); alternatively, they can be conceptual (e.g., a mathematical set or a function). In this 
paper, my focus is primarily on concrete things. 
Composite 
Thing 
Some things are made up of other things (e.g., a system development team, which is a composite 
thing, is made of team members such as programmers or analysts, which are its components). 
Property 
All concrete things in the world possess properties (there are no formless things). Similarly, all 
properties in the world attach to some thing (properties do not exist in isolation from things). 
Properties are not things, however; they are separate ontological constructs that describe different 
elements (features) of the world. For example, a human (a concrete thing) may possess a property 
that he uses an information system, and a computer (a concrete thing) has the property of 
possessing a certain amount of internal memory. 
Class 
Things that possess at least one property in common constitute a class of things. For example, all 
humans who use an information system are members of the class of things called “information 
system users.” 
Attribute 
We “know” about properties of things in the world through our perceptions of them. These 
perceptions may be more or less true. The way in which we perceive a property at a point in time (our 
representation of it) is called an attribute. Various types of attributes exist: 
• Attributes in general are attributes that belong to a class of things (e.g., all humans in the class 
“information system users” possess the attribute called “uses an information system”). 
• Attributes in particular are attributes that belong to specific things in a class of things (e.g., the 
specific person called “John” in the class of things called “users of information systems” possesses 
the particular attribute “uses an information system three times each day”). 
• Intrinsic attributes represent properties of individual things (intrinsic attribute in particular) or classes 
of individual things (intrinsic attribute in general). For example, a specific user of an information 
system called “Jane” has the intrinsic attribute in particular of “age=40 years,” and the class of 
things called “information system users” has the intrinsic attribute in general called “age”). 
• Mutual attributes represent properties of two or more particular things (mutual attribute in particular) 
or two or more classes of things (mutual attribute in general). For example, system analysts and 
information system users have the mutual attribute in general called “level of shared understanding 
about the requirements for a new information system,” which will take on a specific value (mutual 
attribute in particular) for a specific system analyst-information system user pair). 
• Emergent attributes (in particular or in general) are attributes of composite things that do not 
belong to their components. Nonetheless, they are related in some way to attributes of their 
components (e.g., the work productivity of a system development team has no meaning in terms of 
each team member, but it is related in some way to the productivity of each team member). 
• Complex attributes (in particular or in general) are attributes that are made up of the conjunction of 
simple attributes (e.g., the attribute “system quality” is composed of simpler attributes such as 
“response time,” “data accuracy,” ease of use,” and so on). 
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Table 1. Some Fundamental Ontological Constructs (cont.) 
Construct Explanation 
State 
A vector of attributes in particular represents a state of a thing (its attributes in general along with their 
associated values). States can also be conceived as a complex attribute in particular. For instance, a 
particular user of an information system has two attributes in particular (measured on a 10-point 
scale) that relate to the information system: “perceived ease of use = 5” and “perceived usefulness = 
8”). The vector (5,8) corresponding to the values of these two attributes represents the state of the 
user. The complex attribute in general might be called “perceived utility,” and for the particular user it 
has the value (5,8). 
Lawful 
State 
Some states of a thing are deemed lawful (they obey natural or human-made laws); others are 
deemed unlawful. For instance, natural laws (the laws of physics) restrict the minimum response time 
that an online information system can achieve. Response times below this minimum amount are 
unlawful. A social law – legislation to protect the privacy of customers’ data – might constrain an 
organization from outsourcing its information systems to providers in certain foreign countries. 
Event 
An event that a thing undergoes is represented by a change from one of its states to another of its 
states (at least one of its attributes changes values). For instance, in light of a user’s ongoing use of 
an information system, her perceptions might change from one state (perceived ease of use=5, 
perceived usefulness=8) to another state (perceived ease of use=6, perceived usefulness=5). The 
event is represented by <(5,8),(6,5)>. 
Lawful 
Event 
Some events that a thing undergoes are deemed lawful (they obey natural or human-made laws); 
others are deemed unlawful. If an event has an unlawful beginning or end state, it will be unlawful. 
Some events are unlawful, however, even when their beginning and end states are lawful. For 
example, “has low experience with an information system X” and “has high experience with an 
information system X” are lawful states of a human thing. The event represented by the state change 
from “has low experience an information system X” to “has high experience with an information 
system X” is lawful; the event represented by the state change from “has high experience with an 
information system X” to “has low experience with an information system X” is unlawful. 
History of a 
Thing 
The history of a thing is a sequence (ordered set) of its states (e.g., the states that a thing traverses 
over time are ordered by time). For example, a user’s perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness of a particular information system at three points in time might be represented by the 
following sequence of pairs: <(5,8),(6,5),(7,5)>. The three pairs show the history of the user. 
Interaction 
between 
Things 
Two things interact when the history of one thing is not independent of the history of the other thing. 
For example, consider two users, X and Y, of a particular information system. If they never meet 
during their use of the information system, assume X’s history (at three points in time) of perceived 
ease of use and perceived usefulness is <(5,8),(6,5),(7,5)> and Y’s history of perceived ease of use 
and perceived usefulness is <(6,7),(7,7),(7,8)>. If X and Y interact during their use of the information 
system, one or both might then have different perceptions about the ease of use and usefulness of 
the information system. For instance, Y might assist X to use the information system such that X’s 
history is now <(5,8),(6,9),(8,9)>. 
 
In the sections below, I show how Bunge’s ontology can be used to make precise the meaning of 
terms frequently used in discussions about theory. I show, also, how this enhanced precision can be 
used to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of a theory. 
3. Nature of Theory 
Different researchers often ascribe different meanings to the term “theory.” Indeed, the extant 
literature shows a considerable level of disagreement about what constitutes a theory, and what 
constitutes “strong” theory versus “weak” theory (see, e.g., Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 371). In this 
section, therefore, I explain the meaning I ascribe to the term “theory” to provide a context for the 
conditions I lay out subsequently for a theory to be considered “strong.” 
3.1. A Particular View of What Constitutes a Theory 
By theory, I mean a particular kind of model that is intended to account for some subset of 
phenomena in the real world. A theory is a social construction (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 7-10). It 
is an artifact built by humans to achieve some purpose. It is a conceptual thing rather than a concrete 
thing. Nonetheless, it has a concrete manifestation as a neuronal pattern in some person’s brain. 
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By phenomena, I mean someone’s perceptions of facts in the real world – the existence of things, the 
properties these things possess, the states these things experience, and the events these things 
undergo (see Table 1). The subset of phenomena in the world that the theory is intended to cover is 
called its domain. The phenomena in a theory’s domain, in turn, can be partitioned into two subsets: 
(a) the focal phenomena, which are the primary focus of the theory; and (b) the ancillary phenomena, 
which are somehow associated either directly or indirectly with the focal phenomena. 
 
The phenomena that are the focus of a theory usually apply to things in a class or things in several 
classes. Of course, it is possible to construct a theory about the properties, states, and events 
pertaining to an individual thing in the world (e.g., a specific person or a specific information system). 
For the most part, however, researchers are interested in constructing theories to account for 
phenomena that are common to more than one thing. 
 
The phenomena that theories cover may be static phenomena (states of things at a point in time), 
dynamic phenomena (events that occur to things), or a combination of both static and dynamic 
phenomena. If the theory covers static phenomena, the researcher who proposes the theory should 
make clear whether the states of a thing (or things) that are covered are intended to be stable (in 
equilibrium) or unstable (in transition to equilibrium). Empiricists who wish to test a theory that covers 
static phenomena need to know whether they should measure the phenomena when they are in a 
stable state or an unstable state. 
 
By account, I mean a theory assists its users to explain and predict its focal phenomena. Some 
researchers argue theories can have still another purpose – namely, to facilitate human 
understanding of the theory’s focal phenomena (e.g., Hovorka & Lee, 2010). I do not see how a high-
quality explanation of focal phenomena can occur, however, without first understanding the focal 
phenomena. For this reason, I intend the purpose of explanation to encompass the purpose of 
understanding. 
 
By model, I mean an abstracted, simplified, concise representation of something else (phenomena) in 
the world. Models help us to comprehend the world by representing only those major features of the 
world that are important for our purposes. Often they provide only an approximate account of the 
complexity that exists in the real-world phenomena they cover. They compromise precision to achieve 
cognitive economy. 
 
Theories are particular kinds of models, however (see Section 4 below). All theories are models, but 
not all models are theories. A model must satisfy certain conditions before I deem it to be a theory 
(see Section 4 below) – conditions that relate to rigorous specification of its “parts” and particular 
qualities of its “whole.” Thus, the existence of a model is a necessary condition for the existence of a 
theory, but it is not a sufficient condition. The existence of a theory, however, is a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a model. 
3.2. Some Prior Notions of Theory 
To further clarify my notion of “theory,” consider the taxonomy of theories proposed by Gregor (2006). 
Based on an extensive review of prior literature, she identifies five ways in which the term “theory” 
has been used: Type I – theories for analysis; Type II – theories for explanation; Type III – theories 
for prediction; Type IV – theories for explanation and prediction; and Type V – theories for design and 
action. 
 
In my view, those she calls Type-I theories (theories for analysis) are typologies and not theories (see 
also Bacharach, 1989, p. 497). Typologies underpin precise definition of the constructs in a theory, 
but they lack some characteristics that I deem important to a theory (see my arguments in Section 4 
below). Furthermore, in my view, those Gregor (2006) calls Type-V theories (theories for design and 
action) are models but not theories. As with typologies, models lack some characteristics that I deem 
important to a theory (again, see my arguments in Section 4 below). 
 
  
Weber/Evaluating and Developing IS Theory 
 
6 Journal of the Association for Information Systems  Vol. 13 Issue 1 pp. 1-30 January 2012 
 
Gregor’s (2006) Type-II theories (theories for explaining) and Type-III theories (theories for predicting) 
may or may not, in my view, constitute theories (depending on how rigorously their “parts” have been 
articulated and the qualities possessed by their “whole”). For instance, Gregor argues (p. 625) some 
types of Type-II theories are used primarily as high-level “sensitizing devices.” They sometimes lack 
clarity and precision in relation to their constructs, relationships among constructs, states they cover, 
and events they cover. Type-II theories often are used within the so-called interpretivist research 
paradigm (Klein & Myers 1999, p. 75). Where rigor is lacking, I see Type-II theories as constituting 
models but not theories. Similarly, Gregor argues (p. 626) Type-III theories do not always provide a 
clear account of the associations among the constructs they employ. If this is the case, again, in my 
view they do not constitute theories. They are models only, because they lack certain qualities 
needed to constitute a theory – namely, rigorous specification of all their “parts,” which, in turn, 
undermines some qualities of their “whole.” 
 
In short, my notion of theory is best aligned with Gregor’s (2006) Type IV theory – a theory for 
explanation and prediction. Nonetheless, my reluctance to ascribe the term “theory” to her other types 
of theory (Types I, II, III, and V) in no way is intended to denigrate the significance of these types of 
contributions in scholars’ research endeavors. Indeed, Gregor (2006) provides compelling 
explanations for why they make important contributions to the development of knowledge. Rather, I 
am seeking to be clear about my notion of what constitutes a theory to provide a context for the 
arguments I develop below. 
4. A Framework and Criteria for Theory Evaluation 
In this section, I argue a theory should be evaluated from two perspectives. The first is the “parts” – 
the evaluation should focus on the quality of the individual components that make up the theory. I 
provide criteria for evaluating these components. The second is the “whole” – the evaluation should 
focus on the quality of the theory considered in toto. I also provide criteria for evaluating the whole. 
 
Both forms of evaluation are important in assessing the quality of a theory. It is unlikely the quality of 
the whole will be high if the quality of the parts is not high. Nonetheless, high-quality parts are not a 
sufficient condition for a high-quality whole. To the extent a model satisfies the criteria for high-quality 
parts and a high-quality whole, it can be deemed a theory. 
4.1. Parts 
All theories have three parts: their constructs; their associations; and the states they cover. In 
addition, theories that cover dynamic phenomena have a fourth part – namely, the events they cover. 
When evaluating a theory, the focus initially should be on the quality of its parts. 
 
The parts of a theory need to be described precisely because they circumscribe the boundary or 
domain of the theory – that is, the phenomena it is intended to cover. If researchers have a clear 
understanding of the theory’s parts, they are better able to design tests that fall within the theory’s 
domain rather than unwittingly testing the theory in an inappropriate context (a context outside the 
boundary of the theory). They are also better able to filter data they have collected so they undertake 
tests on only the subset representing phenomena in the domain the theory covers. Indeed, some 
scholars argue that a field’s understanding of the boundary conditions associated with its theories is a 
good proxy for the quality of its theories and the state of the field more generally (e.g., Gray & 
Cooper, 2010, p. 627). 
 
The following subsections explain the nature of each part. They also describe criteria that can be 
used to evaluate how well a researcher has articulated each of the parts. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the analysis that follows. 
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Figure 1. Framework and Criteria for Evaluating a Theory’s “Parts” 
4.1.1. Constructs 
A construct in a theory represents an attribute in general of some class of things in its domain (as 
opposed to a particular attribute of a specific thing). The classes of things to which attributes in general 
pertain ought to be defined precisely to ensure that the meanings of each class and the things in each 
class are clear. Otherwise, the exact nature of the things that the theory covers will not be clear. 
Moreover, the meanings of the attributes in general that attach to the classes of things the theory covers 
are unlikely to be clear. Attributes do not float in the ether; they always attach to things. As a first step in 
clarifying the meaning of an attribute, therefore, the thing to which it attaches needs to be made clear. 
 
For example, the well-known Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) is a theory that had in its 
earliest versions (and many later versions) only one class of things in its domain – namely, individual users 
of some form of information technology. To be a member of this class, things had to possess only two 
attributes in general: (a) they had to be humans, and (b) they had to be users of some form of information 
technology. Similarly, Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj, and Grover (2003, p. 241) state that their theory covers 
only a particular class of things: “…our theory’s boundary condition is firms operating in moderate to rapidly 
changing business environments, such as the high-tech, retailing, and financial services sectors.” 
 
Once the meanings of the classes of things that a theory covers are clear, the nature of each attribute in 
general that pertains to a particular class ought to be defined precisely. Unless the meanings of the 
attributes in general are clear, the meanings of any associations among them will not be clear. 
Moreover, developing credible (valid and reliable) empirical indicators of the attributes in general will be 
difficult (if not impossible). Interpreting the meaning of data collected about the attributes will also be 
difficult (if not impossible). 
 
For example, Davis (1989, p. 320) defines precisely two attributes in general of TAM’s single class of things 
(individual users of information systems): (a) perceived usefulness, and (b) perceived ease of use. Variations 
in the values of these two attributes in general for particular users of an information technology are the 
ancillary phenomena in TAM’s domain. Variations in the values of a third attribute in general, system usage, 
are the focal phenomena in TAM (but, interestingly, Davis defines system usage only indirectly in his paper). 
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When two or more constructs in a theory represent attributes in general of the same class of things, 
care must be taken that the constructs are not different proxies for the same underlying property in 
general of the class of things. Otherwise, any association detected between variations in the values of 
the constructs simply manifests a variation in the values of a single underlying property in general of 
the class of things (in other words, it is a tautological association). Because we can only know the 
properties of things imperfectly (hence our use of attributes), the evaluation of whether attributes 
overlap in their representation of a property is important but is sometimes difficult to undertake. 
 
For example, in TAM, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and system usage are all attributes 
in general of a single class of things (the humans who use some form of information technology). The 
value of TAM as a theory depends in part upon these three attributes in general not being proxies for a 
single underlying property in general of the humans who use information technologies. 
4.1.2. Associations 
Associations in a theory can have multiple meanings. When evaluating the meaning to ascribe to an 
association, at the outset it is important to reflect upon whether a theory covers only static 
phenomena, dynamic phenomena, or a combination of both static and dynamic phenomena. It is also 
important to understand whether the constructs represent attributes in general of a single class of 
things or multiple classes of things. 
 
If the theory covers static phenomena, an association shows that the values of one construct are 
somehow related to the values of another construct. The relationship is intended to reflect a pattern 
that is hypothesized to hold across instances of things in the class or classes of things that the theory 
covers. For instance, when “snapshots” of the phenomena that pertain to things in a class are taken 
at some point in time and the values of attributes of things in the class are examined, the theory might 
predict that high values for instances of one construct will tend to be associated with low values for 
instances of another construct. 
 
Associations that cover static phenomena can be specified with varying levels of precision: 
 
• Two constructs are simply shown as related to each other, but the sign is not shown. 
 
• The sign of the association between two constructs is shown, which indicates that the 
values for instances of one of the constructs are positively or negatively related to the 
values for instances of the other construct. 
 
• A functional relationship between two constructs is shown. For instance, the value of 
one construct is shown as twice the value of the other construct. 
 
An association that covers static phenomena may show directionality if the values of one construct 
are believed to arise prior to the values of another construct. For example, at some point in time some 
researchers might seek to test TAM by measuring the values of perceived ease of use, perceived 
usefulness, and system usage. Even though they have captured the values of the three constructs at 
a single point of time, they might believe that the values for perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness would have arisen prior to the value for system usage. Thus, they would show 
directionality on the association between perceived ease of use and system usage and perceived 
usefulness and system usage. 
 
An association between two constructs in a theory that covers dynamic phenomena (events) shows 
that a history of values for instances of one of the constructs is conditional on a history of values for 
instances of the other construct. In a diagrammatic representation of the association, often an arrow 
is placed on the association to show which construct’s change in values precedes the other 
construct’s change in values. 
 
As with associations that cover static phenomena, associations that cover dynamic phenomena can 
be specified with varying levels of precision: 
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• Two constructs are simply shown as related to each other, but neither the sign nor the 
direction of the association is revealed. Perhaps uncertainty exists about the sign or 
direction of the association. Some indication is given, however, that changes in the 
value for an instance of one construct precede changes in the value for an instance of 
the other construct, even if the sign or direction is unclear (e.g., the uncertain nature of 
the dynamics is explained in a narrative). 
 
• The sign of the association between two constructs is shown, which indicates that 
changes in the value for an instance of one of the constructs are positively or negatively 
correlated with subsequent changes in the value for an instance of the other construct. 
Uncertainty exists, however, about the direction of the association. 
 
• The direction of the association between two constructs is shown, which implies the 
existence of causality or shows a time relationship among changes in the values for 
instances of the constructs – for instance, changes in the value for an instance of one 
construct cause a change in the value for an instance of the other construct, or a 
change in the value for an instance of one construct precedes a change in the value for 
an instance of the other construct. 
 
• A functional association is shown between two constructs. In other words, the amount of 
change that occurs in the value for an instance of one construct is shown as a result of 
or subsequent to the amount of change that occurs in the value for an instance of 
another construct. 
 
The constructs in an association may pertain to a single class of things or multiple classes of things. If 
two constructs represent different attributes in general of a single class of things, any association 
between the two attributes implies they are “lawfully” related in some way (association type (a) in 
Figure 2). In other words, for an instance of a thing in the class, the value or a change in the value of 
one of its attributes is related to a value or a change in the value of another of its attributes. 
 
For example, in Sambamurthy et al.’s (2003) theory, the attributes in general named “digital options” 
and “agility” belong to a single class of things (firms of a certain type). Thus, the association that 
Sambamurthy et al. (2003) posit exists between these two attributes means they are lawfully related. 
They propose a two-way causal (and, therefore, time-sequenced) relationship in which “higher levels 
of agility will…enhance digital options” (p. 255) and “the impact of digital options…on agility” will be 
positively moderated by a third construct (namely, “entrepreneurial alertness,” which is also an 
attribute in general of the type of firm their theory covers) (p. 253). 
 
If two constructs represent different attributes in general of two different classes of things, any 
association between them means at least one instance of a thing in one class interacts with at least 
one instance of a thing in the other class (association type (b) in Figure 2). In other words, the history 
of a thing in one class of things is not independent of some thing in the other class of things. The 
nature of the interactions between the two things is manifested in the attributes that are related. 
 
For example, an extension to the original TAM might posit that variations in the measured response 
time (as opposed to perceived response time) of online information systems might be associated with 
users’ perceptions of these systems’ usefulness. Whereas “perceived usefulness” is an attribute in 
general of a class of things called “online information system users,” “measured response time” is an 
attribute in general of a class of things called “online information systems.” At least one thing in one 
class interacts with at least one thing in the other class. For example, variations in a particular user’s 
perceptions of the perceived usefulness of an online information system she is using are associated 
with variations in the measured response time of the system. 
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Figure 2. Two Types of Associations in a Theory 
 
Theories that cover dynamic phenomena (events) sometimes replicate constructs in diagrammatic 
representations of the theory and show directional associations between the replicated constructs 
(e.g., Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 159-161). For instance, a theory might be proposed to account for 
the evolution of system analysts’ knowledge as they attempt to build an entity-relationship model of 
an application domain. Several instances of a construct called “system analyst’s knowledge” might 
appear in a diagrammatic representation of the theory, all of which are linked by directional 
associations. The theory might show that one value of the construct (e.g., an “entities-known” state) 
precedes another value of the construct (e.g., a “relationships-known” state), which, in turn, precedes 
another value of the construct (e.g., an “attributes-known” state). In short, when system analysts build 
an entity-relationship model of an application domain, the theory indicates that they first acquire 
knowledge of the entities in the domain, then acquire knowledge of the relationships in the domain, 
and then acquire knowledge of the attributes in the domain. 
 
Alternatively, diagrammatic representations of dynamic phenomena associated with a construct 
sometimes use a graph, where the possible values of an instance of the construct are shown on one 
axis and time is shown on the other axis (e.g., Monge, 1990, pp. 411-413, 415-419). The graph 
shows typical values of an instance of the construct as they unfold over time. 
 
To the extent the nature of the associations among constructs in a theory is made more explicit, more-
powerful empirical tests of the theory can be done (tests that are more likely to lead to the theory not 
being supported). For example, assume a theory shows only associations or only directional 
associations among its constructs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, more-rigorous research designs lead to 
weaker tests of such a theory (a paradox noted by Meehl, 1967). The reason is that even a small 
amount of covariation between the values of any two constructs in the theory is likely to be detected in 
the data obtained – that is, the null hypothesis is likely to be rejected. Whether the covariation reflects 
ambient noise in the data (the average variance that is common to unrelated constructs) or the 
magnitude of the association detected is practically significant, however, is another matter. 
 
On the other hand, if the theory articulated associations with a functional form (e.g., concave, convex, 
stepped linear), posited the values of its associations’ parameters (e.g., two constructs will be associated 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.70), or enunciated contingent (moderated) associations, more rigorous 
research designs are more likely to lead to obtaining data that shows lack of support for the theory (Edwards 
& Berry, 2010; Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010). In other words, stronger tests of the theory are possible. 
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Similarly, if a theory is intended to cover a time series of dynamic phenomena (events), stronger tests 
of the theory can be undertaken if change parameters are specified more precisely – for instance, 
whether the change is continuous, the magnitude of value or state changes at different points of time, 
the rate of change of values or states, the trend in values or states, the periodicity of changes in 
values or states (length of time between the same or similar values or states), and the duration for 
which a particular value of state remains constant (Abbott, 1990; Monge, 1990). The extent to which 
these sorts of parameters can be specified precisely, however, depends of the quality of the 
“narrative” used to explain the nature of the association (transition) between different values or states 
of a construct (e.g., Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000). 
 
Usually, a theory does not cover all possible associations among its constructs. Instead, researchers 
seek to make astute decisions about what associations to include in the theory and what associations 
to omit from the theory. The omission of an association among constructs in a theory does not 
necessarily mean none exists among the constructs. Rather, the researcher who proposes the theory 
has deemed the association to be outside the boundary of the theory. 
 
Researchers ought to provide compelling justifications for whatever associations they decide to 
include within the boundary of their theory. On the one hand, a justificatory narrative may be 
compelling because it provides interesting, novel insights about how two or more constructs are 
related or a time series of events in a construct unfolds. It engages other researchers because it 
reveals aspects of the focal or ancillary phenomena that previously they had not contemplated. On 
the other hand, a justificatory narrative may be compelling because it is deemed uncontroversial or it 
is rooted in prior, widely accepted research–for instance, prior theoretical work or prior empirical work.  
In other words, it is compelling because it is relatively unsurprising–it resonates with knowledge that 
other researchers already possess. Whichever justificatory basis is used, the association should be 
material. It is included within the boundary of the theory because it is expected to account for a 
significant amount of shared variation between the constructs it covers, or it represents a strong 
causal link between the constructs it covers, or it shows an important time series of events in a 
construct it covers. 
4.1.3. States 
A theory should specify clearly and as precisely as possible the state space of things in the class or 
classes of things that it is intended to cover. In other words, it should stipulate those states that might 
arise for things in the class or classes of things that fall within its domain and for which it is intended 
to have explanatory and predictive power. 
 
To determine the state space that falls within a theory’s boundary, the range of values that each 
construct in the theory might cover first needs to be determined. All combinations of values (the 
Cartesian product) for the set of constructs in the theory then need to be considered. The set of 
combinations of values constitutes the conceivable state space for the set of constructs in the theory. 
Some combinations can be eliminated because they cannot occur naturally (they are unlawful, at 
least for the class or classes of things that the theory is intended to cover) and, thus, fall outside the 
boundary of the theory. Those that remain must then be evaluated to determine whether they are 
covered by the theory. In other words, states that can occur naturally must be partitioned into inside-
boundary states and outside-boundary states. 
 
To illustrate these concepts, assume we are developing a theory based on TAM about how system 
usage will change over time as users of some form of information technology experience changes in 
their perceptions of its ease of use and usefulness. At the outset, we might wish to be more specific 
than TAM about the class of things (individual users of some form of information technology) covered 
by our theory. For example, we might indicate our theory covers only individual users who are rational 
according to some criteria, already have some level of exposure to information technology, have 
volitional use of a form of information technology designed specifically to support individuals (rather 
than groups), work only in certain application domains, and are not subject to intense time pressures 
in the tasks they undertake. (Recall, I have argued a high-quality theory will be especially clear about 
the class or classes of things it covers.) 
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To be congruent with TAM, assume we have only three constructs in our theory (all are attributes in 
general of individual users of some form of information technology): system usage, perceived ease of 
use, and perceived usefulness. Assume, also, that the three constructs have been defined precisely. 
For simplicity, assume we have a valid and reliable measure of each construct, and each measure 
uses a 10-point scale (with 1 representing low values on the scale and 10 representing high values 
on the scale). In this light, our theory’s conceivable state space contains 1,000 states (10×10×10). 
 
We might then argue some states can be eliminated because they are unlawful. For example, 
assume we believe no user who falls within the class of things covered by our theory will have a value 
of system usage of 9 or 10, but will have values for perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness 
that are both equal to or less than 2. Thus, eight states are unlawful in our theory because we believe 
they will never occur “naturally”: (9,1,1), (9,1,2), (9,2,1), (9,2,2), (10,1,1), (10,1,2), (10,2,1), (10,2,2). 
For instance, we might believe such states would occur only in relation to users who are irrational or 
forced to use the system. We might then conclude, however, that none of the remaining 992 states 
falls outside the boundary of our theory – in other words, the set of outside-boundary states is the null 
set. In short, we intend our theory to cover all remaining 992 states that might arise as a result of 
relationships among the three constructs. 
 
Our TAM example illustrates that practically, for many theories, each state in the set of conceivable 
states of a theory cannot be considered to determine whether it falls within the boundary of the 
theory. The reason is that the number of conceivable states is too large. Nonetheless, our TAM 
example illustrates the kind of clarity about states that theoreticians must strive to achieve in 
specifying the boundaries of their theories. While they may find it difficult or impossible to list 
exhaustively all the states they need to consider, they might be able to describe the broad 
characteristics of states that fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. For instance, they 
might seek to identify the characteristics of extreme-value states or unlikely states and to indicate 
whether such states fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. Crafting a clear narrative to 
describe the subspace of the conceivable state space that the theory covers is often a difficult task. 
Perhaps for this reason, consideration of a theory’s inside-boundary states is often missing or treated 
only cursorily in theoretical accounts. 
4.1.4. Events 
If a theory is intended to cover events, the event space that falls within the theory’s boundary must 
also be articulated. At the outset, all conceptually possible pairs of inside-boundary states must be 
considered (recall, each event can be conceived as a before-state, after-state pair). These constitute 
the conceivable event space covered by the theory. Some combinations can be eliminated because 
they cannot occur naturally (they are unlawful). Those that remain must be evaluated to determine 
whether they are covered by the theory. In other words, they must be partitioned into inside-boundary 
events and outside-boundary events. 
 
To illustrate these concepts, consider again our putative theory based on TAM about how system 
usage will change over time as users of some form of information technology experience changes in 
their perceptions of the technology’s ease of use and usefulness. Recall, we have 992 inside-
boundary states in our theory. In this light, the conceivable event space in our theory contains 
984,064 events (992 before-states×992 after-states). We might conclude initially that some of these 
events are unlawful because they cannot occur naturally for users in the class of information 
technology users who fall within the boundary of our theory – specifically, those events that involve 
(a) an increase in the values of both perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness but a decrease 
in the value of system usage, or (b) a decrease in the values of both perceived ease of use and 
perceived usefulness but an increase in the value of system usage. We might believe, for instance, 
that such events would occur only for information system users who are irrational (those outside the 
boundary of our theory). In this light, the following two events are examples of those we deem to be 
unlawful: <(8,4,5)(6,5,7)> and <(3,4,3)(5,3,1)>. 
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Of the remaining lawful events, we might then deem any event involving a change in value of 6 or more in 
both perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness falls outside the boundary of our theory. In other 
words, our theory is not intended to cover events that involve large changes of values in these constructs. 
We might believe, for instance, that such events would occur only when some other infrequently occurring 
factor has had a major impact on information system users and, thus, our ability to explain and predict 
system usage via our theory is undermined. As a result, the following two events are examples of events 
that would fall outside the boundary of our theory: <(8,8,9)(7,2,1)> and <(3,3,1)(4,10,8)>. 
 
As with states, our TAM example illustrates that practically, for many theories, each event in the set of 
conceivable events of a theory cannot be considered to determine whether it falls within the boundary 
of the theory because the number of conceivable events is too large. In this light, theorists might seek 
to identify the characteristics of extreme events or unlikely events and to indicate whether such 
events fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. As with states, however, crafting a clear 
narrative that describes the inside-boundary events is often difficult. For this reason, it too is often 
missing or treated only cursorily in theoretical accounts. 
4.2. Whole 
A theory has emergent attributes – attributes of the theory as a whole rather than attributes of its 
parts. Many such attributes exist, and researchers often differ in their views on the significance they 
ascribe to each of them. Nonetheless, some emergent attributes have widespread acceptance among 
researchers as being significant when assessing the quality of a theory. The following subsections 
explain the nature of these attributes and describe criteria that can be used to evaluate the extent to 
which a theory possesses them. Figure 3 provides an overview of the analysis that follows. 
 
 
Figure 3. Framework and Criteria for Evaluating a Theory’s “Whole” 
4.2.1. Importance 
The importance (or utility) of a theory is often assessed via judgments made about the importance of 
its focal phenomena (Corley & Gioia, 2011, pp. 17-19). Usually, there is little point to having a theory 
with rigorously specified constructs, associations, inside-boundary states, and inside-boundary events 
if it addresses uninteresting phenomena (Weber, 2003a). The focal phenomena might be deemed 
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important from the viewpoint of practice (improving the effectiveness and efficiency of some entity’s 
activities). They might also be deemed important from the viewpoint of research (science). Potentially, 
enhanced understanding of the focal phenomena will provide key insights that enable theoretical or 
empirical progress to be made on some problem within a discipline. 
 
Ex ante it might be difficult to judge the importance of a theory. At the outset, its potential impact on 
researchers and practitioners might be difficult to evaluate. Moreover, sometimes a theory provides 
insights not anticipated when it was first articulated. Such insights arise only when researchers 
engage with the theory and use it to inform their empirical work. 
 
Ex post, however, various metrics can be used to assess the importance of a theory. For example, 
the extent to which researchers cite a theory provides an indicator of its impact on their work and, 
thus, its likely importance to them. Similarly, whether the theory underpins consulting work that 
practitioners undertake or provides the foundation for a successful patent or motivates the 
establishment of a new company is an indicator of its importance. 
 
Citation evidence must be treated cautiously when it is used as a proxy for the importance of a 
theory. Some theories are appealing to researchers because they are relatively simple to test 
empirically. They are perceived as an easy route to journal publications. Whether they provide deep 
insights into the phenomena they cover, however, is another matter. 
4.2.2. Novelty 
The extent to which a theory is novel is an important factor determining (a) the value ascribed to it by 
researchers, and (b) the likelihood that papers describing the theory will be accepted for publication in 
major journals (e.g., Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Mone & McKinley, 1993; Corley & Gioia, 2011). 
Thus, judgments about a theory’s novelty or originality and judgments about its contributions to 
knowledge appear to be closely related. Moreover, “revelatory” or “transformative” theoretical 
insights, in contrast to “incremental” theoretical insights, seem to be especially valued (Corley & 
Gioia, 2011, pp. 16-18). 
 
Weber (2003b) describes several ways in which a theory might make novel contributions to a 
discipline. First, a theory’s focal phenomena might not have been covered by prior theories. However, 
if the theory is simply a slightly modified version of an existing theory that has been applied to new 
phenomena, it is unlikely to be deemed novel. Second, a theory might be considered novel because it 
frames or conceives existing, well-known focal phenomena in new ways. For example, Lamb and 
Kling (2003) is a well-cited paper, perhaps because it argues phenomena associated with information 
system users need to be considered from a broader, social-actor perspective rather than a narrow, 
individualistic perspective (the latter perspective previously had been dominant in the literature). 
Third, a theory’s novelty might arise because of important changes it makes to an existing theory – it 
might add and/or delete constructs and associations, define existing constructs and associations 
more precisely, or specify the boundary of the theory more precisely. 
 
A theory will be deemed novel (perhaps after some time has elapsed) to the extent it changes the 
paradigms used by researchers to investigate phenomena within their discipline (Kuhn, 1996). It will 
command the attention of researchers if it provides a way of resolving “anomalies” within their 
discipline – that is, empirical observations of phenomena that existing theories are unable to explain 
or predict. It will also command the attention of researchers if it enables them to “see” or conceive 
new and interesting phenomena (phenomena that previously escaped their attention) or 
reconceptualize existing phenomena in new and interesting ways. Such theories break the cycle of 
“normal science” within a discipline and set new paths for the discipline to follow. 
 
The quality of the rhetoric used by researchers to describe their theories also appears to be an 
important factor in determining the extent to which their theories are deemed novel (Locke & Golden-
Biddle, 1997). Because science is a social phenomenon, researchers have to convince their colleagues 
that their work has value. In this light, the arguments researchers use to expound their theories’ novelty 
must be crafted carefully; otherwise, their theories’ contribution to knowledge might be overlooked. 
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After analyzing 82 papers published in the Academy of Management Journal and Administrative 
Science Quarterly (two high-quality, high-impact journals) between January 1976 and September 1996, 
Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) concluded that researchers who had successfully demonstrated the 
novelty or contribution of their research use two rhetorical strategies. First, they “legitimize” their work by 
“constructing intertextual coherence.” They “re-present and organize existing knowledge so as to 
configure a context for contribution” (p. 1029) (see also Webster & Watson, 2002). Second, they 
“subvert” or “problematize” the existing literature. They do so to show that opportunities exist for 
contributions to knowledge. One way in which the novelty of a theory can be assessed ex ante, 
therefore, is to evaluate how well its proponents enact Locke and Golden-Biddle’s two strategies. 
4.2.3. Parsimony 
High-quality theories are parsimonious (e.g., Hempel, 1966, pp. 40-45; Popper, 2005, pp. 131, 272). 
They achieve good levels of predictive and explanatory power in relation to their focal phenomena 
using a small number of constructs and associations. By using a small number of constructs, they 
also limit the size of their conceivable state space and conceivable event space. As a result, it is often 
easier to articulate the nature of states and events that fall within the boundary of the theory. Thus, 
the boundary of parsimonious theories often can be stated more precisely because the class (or 
classes) of things, associations, states, and events covered by the theory can be defined precisely. 
 
What constitutes a “small number” is in the eyes of the beholder. Nonetheless, Miller’s (1956) classic 
paper on the “magical number seven, plus or minus two” suggests some guidelines. Humans appear 
able to manipulate about seven “chunks” of information in short-term memory. In this light, one might 
predict researchers would deem a theory to be parsimonious if it has no more than about seven 
constructs and seven associations (and perhaps the desired number in each case is less than seven) 
and the number of inside-boundary states and inside-boundary events is not large. 
 
When building a theory, researchers are often tempted to include more constructs and more 
associations in an attempt to capture the “richness” of the phenomena they are seeking to predict or 
explain (and my experience is the inclusion of more constructs and associations is often a frequent 
request made by the reviewers of journal papers!). Parsimony dictates, however, that some constructs 
and associations must be omitted from a theory. In choosing constructs to omit, those whose instances 
have little variation in their values (states) are likely candidates. In choosing associations to omit, those 
where few instances of constructs are related to other instances of constructs are likely candidates. 
 
Often, a trade-off must be made between parsimony and a theory’s predictive and/or explanatory 
power. As the number of constructs and associations increases, the theory might be better able to 
predict and/or explain the focal phenomena. Nonetheless, at some point, users of the theory will 
deem it to be too complex. The goal is to achieve high levels of prediction and/or explanation with a 
small number of theoretical components (Ockham’s Razor). 
4.2.4. Level 
Some theories cover a very narrow, constrained set of phenomena. They are often called “micro-
level” theories. On the one hand, a micro-level theory’s constructs and associations might be defined 
precisely. Moreover, its predictive and/or explanatory powers might be high in relation to the 
phenomena it covers. Because of the limited range of phenomena it covers, however, it runs the risk 
it will be deemed uninteresting and unimportant. 
 
Some theories cover a broad range of phenomena. They are often called “macro-level” theories. In 
some ways, a macro-level theory might be compelling because it provides broad, overall insights into 
many phenomena. It has a high level of generality. Often, however, its constructs and associations are 
defined imprecisely. As a result, its predictive and/or explanatory powers in relation to the more-specific 
phenomena that are a researcher’s focus are limited. In this regard, Weick (1995, pp. 389-390) points 
out that generality can be attained only by trading off a theory’s accuracy and/or simplicity (parsimony). 
Moreover, if a theory is at too high a level and too general, it runs the risk that eventually it will be 
discredited because it ends up as a “theory of everything” in a discipline (e.g., see Davis, 2010, pp. 697-
699) criticisms of New Institutional Theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in organizational research). 
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Merton (1957) argues the primary theories used in a discipline ought to be “middle-range” (or “meso-
level”) theories. On the one hand, such theories avoid “narrow empiricism.” On the other hand, they 
avoid being so general in their coverage that it is difficult, if not impossible, to test them empirically. 
Moreover, meso-level theories often have value because they link the micro-level world and macro-
level world in a discipline. 
 
In spite of the wide acceptance of Merton’s idea within many disciplines, the precise meaning of 
“middle-range theories” remains problematic (Boudon, 1991). Whether a theory is set at an 
appropriate level is a subjective matter. Also, a level that is too high or too low in one discipline might 
be an appropriate level in another discipline. Nonetheless, in the context of their discipline, in due 
course researchers make judgments about whether a theory is formulated at an appropriate level – 
whether it is too specific or too broad to be interesting and/or useful. 
4.2.5. Falsifiability 
Most, if not all, theories cannot be proven via empirical tests, because it is impossible to test the theory 
for all things, all instances of associations, all states, and all events that fall within its boundary. Instead, 
support for a theory grows when its powers of prediction and/or explanation remain robust across 
different tests of the theory (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, pp. 202-218; Hempel, 1966, pp. 33-46). If the theory 
has been articulated clearly, these tests can be designed strategically. They can be used to examine 
conditions researchers believe are most likely to lead to the theory being falsified (failing the empirical 
test) rather than supported (Doty & Glick, 1994; Popper, 2005, pp. 57-73). They facilitate “risk-taking” 
tests of the theory – tests that are likely to disconfirm the theory rather than to support it. 
 
To be capable of falsifying a theory, researchers must be capable of generating precise predictions 
about the focal phenomena so they can undertake reasonably exact empirical tests of the theory. If 
the predictions they are able to generate are so vague that the status of empirical tests they 
undertake always remains problematic or, alternatively, the empirical outcomes can always be 
finessed (explained) using the theory, the value of the theory is undermined. 
 
Similarly, if the classes of things, associations, states, and events that fall within the boundary of a theory 
are unclear, the meaning that can be ascribed to empirical tests that fail to support the theory is unclear. 
The results may simply mean that an invalid and unreliable empirical evaluation of the theory has been 
undertaken, or the evaluation applies to states and events that fall outside the theory’s domain. 
 
High-quality theories also suggest the kinds of empirical work that might lead them to be falsified (or 
conversely receive strong confirmation). For example, their putative applicability to a wide variety of 
phenomena will be clear (Hempel, 1966, pp. 33-37). Thus, researchers can infer how to test the theory 
under a large number and a great diversity of conditions. As discussed above, high-quality theories also 
enable researchers to “see” new phenomena – phenomena not conceived or considered at the time the 
theory was formulated (Hempel, 1966, pp. 37-38). Such phenomena provide strong tests of the theory 
because a priori the theory was not formulated to take these phenomena into account. 
5. Using the Evaluation Framework and Criteria: An Example 
To show how the evaluation framework and criteria I have proposed above can be used to pinpoint the 
strengths and weaknesses of a theory, assess the likely usefulness of a theory, highlight areas where 
empirical tests of the theory are likely to be problematic, and identify opportunities for refining and 
enhancing the theory, in the subsections below, I examine a paper by Griffith, Sawyer, and Neale 
(2003). This paper examines “the dynamics of knowledge development and transfer in more and less 
virtual teams” (p. 265). This paper is one of several published in a special issue of the MIS Quarterly on 
the topic of “Redefining the Organizational Roles of Information Technology in the Information Age.” The 
stated purpose of the special issue was to “stimulate significant and innovative theoretical thought 
in response to the dramatic changes that had occurred in the 1990s regarding information technology 
and the transformational ways in which information technology was being applied to enable new forms 
of organizations and markets” (emphasis in original) (Zmud, 2003, p. 195). 
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In spite of the special issue’s focus on “significant and innovative theoretical thought,” it is unclear 
whether Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper articulates a theory or a model. Recall, contrary to some 
scholars (e.g., Dubin, 1978; Whetten, 1989), I have argued above that not all models are theories, 
whereas theories are models that possess specific attributes. The distinction is important, because I 
have argued theories must satisfy certain standards of rigor, whereas models can be used to lay 
broad foundations for understanding particular phenomena. 
 
On the one hand, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states it “advances theory” (p. 265). Moreover, it 
articulates a number of propositions, which suggests its focus is theory building. On the other hand, it 
also states it is presenting a “stylized model” (my emphasis) of “individual and social knowledge…and 
how knowledge transfers among individuals and becomes available to the members of the team” (pp. 
268-269). Moreover, throughout the paper, the term “model” is used frequently. Nonetheless, the legend 
for Table 1 of the paper (p. 281) is “Operationalization of Constructs to Test the Theoretical Model” (my 
emphasis), which suggests the model articulated in the paper is, indeed, meant to be a theory. In any 
event, for the sake of illustrating how the evaluation framework and criteria might be used, I have 
assumed Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper presents a theory of virtualness and knowledge in teams. 
 
In evaluating Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper, I am acutely aware from my own work that theory building 
is often an extended process that involves many painstaking iterations (see, in particular, Weick’s 
(1995) eloquent arguments about the process of theory building versus the product of theory 
building). In this regard, Griffith and her colleagues have continued to refine their “stylized model” to 
improve its rigor and, thereby, to better satisfy the conditions I propose for a model to be called a 
theory (Cadiz, Sawyer, & Griffith 2009; Griffith & Sawyer, 2010). Again, my purpose in evaluating 
Griffith et al.’s paper is to illustrate how the framework and criteria I propose can be usefully 
employed. Moreover, I am seeking to develop rather than to subvert or denigrate the substantial 
contribution that Griffith et al. have made. Like Gray and Cooper (2010, p. 622), I believe we invest 
too little effort in developing existing theories compared to constructing new theories. As a result, we 
have a “clutter” of partially articulated, partially tested theories in the information systems discipline 
that leads to “overload” and “disarray.” 
5.1. Parts 
In this subsection, I evaluate how rigorously the constructs, associations, states, and events have 
been articulated in Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory. In this regard, while the evaluation framework and 
criteria I have proposed above pinpoint those parts of the theory that need to be assessed, readers of 
the theory still need to make their own judgments about how rigorously each part has been expressed 
(accordingly, my evaluation below reflects my own judgments). Even where judgments about rigor 
differ, however, the evaluation framework and criteria provide a way for researchers to structure their 
discourse about the quality of a theory’s components. 
5.1.1. Constructs 
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper presents constructs in four places. First, they are shown in Figure 2 (the 
“stylized model”) of the paper (p. 269). Second, they can be gleaned from the 19 propositions stated 
in the paper (pp. 271-278). Third, Table 1 of their paper (p. 281) is intended to “catalogue the 
constructs and assessments necessary to test our model” (p. 280). Fourth, specific constructs are 
discussed at various places in the text of the paper. 
 
A first problem with the paper’s articulation of constructs is that inconsistencies exist among those 
shown in Figure 2 of the paper, those embedded within the propositions in the paper, and those listed 
in Table 1 of the paper. In this regard, Figure 2 of the paper appears to show 17 constructs employed 
in the theory. In my reading of the propositions, however, I can identify potentially 31 different 
constructs (see my Table 2 below). Yet Table 1 of Griffith et al.’s paper shows only 15 constructs that 
must be subject to “assessments.” 
 
At first glance, some inconsistencies appear to represent only naming inconsistencies. For example, 
Figure 2 of Griffiths et al. (2003) shows a construct called “Individualized Knowledge: Implicit,” which 
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is cross-referenced to Proposition 2 (P2) in the paper. Based on the label given to this construct, one 
might expect it refers to the level or amount of implicit knowledge that a member of a virtual team 
possesses. The focus of Proposition 2, however, is on the extent to which implicit knowledge can be 
transferred to explicit knowledge. These are not the same constructs, even though the words “implicit 
knowledge” are used in both. Furthermore, the “assessment” (operationalization) of the “Individual 
Knowledge Types: Implicit” construct in Table 1 of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper does not pertain to the 
extent to which implicit knowledge can be transferred to explicit knowledge (the construct used in P2). 
Rather, it refers to the “extent to which individuals rely on … knowledge which could be codified but 
has been made automatic by practice” (p. 281). 
 
A similar problem exists with a number of other constructs – that is, the meaning that, at first glance, 
might be assigned to a construct shown in Figure 2 of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper does not match the 
construct employed in the propositions (see Table 2 above). Moreover, in some cases, the construct 
used in the propositions (see Table 2 above) does not match the construct in Table 1 of their paper. 
 
Table 2. Constructs in Griffith et al.’s (2003) Theory of Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams 
No. 
Class of 
Things 
Attribute in General 
Propositions in 
Griffith et al. 
Brief Assessment of Construct Definition 
1 Team Level of Virtualness 
P1a, P1b, P3a, 
P3b, P4a, P4b, 
P5a, P5b, P9a, 
P9b, P11a, P13 
Defined clearly on pp. 267-268. 
2 Team 
Likelihood of Transforming Implicit 
Knowledge into Explicit Knowledge 
P1a 
Nature of implicit and explicit knowledge defined 
clearly on pp. 270-271. Likelihood of transformation 
defined somewhat indirectly. 
3 Team 
Likelihood of Having Access to Extant 
Explicit Knowledge 
P1b 
Nature of explicit knowledge defined clearly on pp. 
270-271. Likelihood of having access defined 
somewhat indirectly. 
4 Team 
Extent to Which Implicit Knowledge 
Transferred to Explicit Knowledge 
P2 
Nature of implicit and explicit knowledge defined 
clearly on pp. 270-271. Amount transferred defined 
somewhat indirectly. 
5 Team 
Extent of Proactive Effort Made to 
Verbalize Rules, Terminology, and 
Descriptions 
P2 Not defined clearly. 
6 
Team 
Member 
Amount of Tacit Knowledge Acquired 
from Co-located Sources Transferred 
to Team 
P3a 
Nature of tacit knowledge defined clearly on pp. 270-
271. Amount acquired from co-located sources and 
transferred defined somewhat indirectly (a complex 
attribute in general). 
7 
Team 
Member 
Amount of Tacit Knowledge Acquired 
from Teammates 
P3b 
Nature of tacit knowledge defined clearly on pp. 270-
271. Amount acquired from teammates defined 
somewhat indirectly. 
8 Team 
Level of Difficulty in Forming Collective 
Knowledge 
P4a Defined reasonably clearly on p. 273. 
9 Team 
Level of Experienced Richness of 
Communication 
P4a 
Not defined clearly. Brief comment about 
communication richness on p. 273. 
10 Team 
Amount of Collective Knowledge 
Accessible Via Technological Tools 
P4b Not defined clearly. 
11 Team 
Likelihood of Enacting an Independent 
Approach to Tasks 
P5a, P5b Defined reasonably clearly on p. 274. 
12 Team 
Amount of Shared Understanding of 
Tasks among Team Members 
P5a 
Nature of shared understanding defined clearly on p. 
274. Amount of shared understanding defined 
somewhat indirectly.  
13 Team Level of Interdependence of Work. P5b Defined reasonably clearly on p. 274. 
14 Team 
Level of Access to Tools and 
Structures that Support Highly 
Interdependent Work 
P5b Not defined clearly. 
15 Team 
Level of Appropriation of Tools and 
Structures that Support Highly 
Interdependent Work 
P5b Not defined clearly. 
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Table 2. Constructs in Griffith et al.’s (2003) Theory of Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams 
(cont.) 
No. 
Class of 
Things 
Attribute in General 
Propositions in 
Griffith et al. 
Brief Assessment of Construct Definition 
16 Team Amount of Shared Knowledge P5b 
Not clear whether shared understanding and shared 
knowledge are the same constructs. See 
Propositions 5a and 5b. 
17 
Team 
Member* 
Level of Transition of Potential Team 
Knowledge to Usable Knowledge 
P6 
Nature of potential knowledge defined clearly on p. 
275. Nature of usable knowledge defined somewhat 
indirectly on p. 275. Level of transition defined 
somewhat indirectly. 
18 
Team 
Member 
Level of Individual Absorptive Capacity P6, P7 Defined clearly on p. 275. 
19 
Team 
Member 
Level of Virtual Work/Teamwork P7 
Nature of virtual work defined clearly on pp. 267-268. 
Not clear whether virtual work and virtual teamwork 
(both used in P7) are the same constructs. 
20 
Team 
Member 
Level of Social Interaction of Team 
Members 
P7 
Nature of social interaction defined somewhat 
indirectly on p. 275. Level of social interaction 
defined somewhat indirectly. 
21 Team 
Level of Transition of Potential 
Knowledge to Usable Knowledge 
P8, P12 
Potential team knowledge and usable team 
knowledge defined on pp. 269-270. Level of 
transition between two types of knowledge defined 
somewhat indirectly. 
22 
Team 
Member 
Level of Connections to Relevant 
Communities of Practice 
P8 Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 276. 
23 Team 
Level of Access to Communities of 
Practice 
P9a 
Not clear whether construct 22 and this construct are 
the same. Do “connections” and “access” have the 
same meaning? Also, this construct applies to a 
team whereas construct 22 applies to a team 
member. 
24 Team 
Level of Tacit Knowledge from 
Members’ Links to Communities of 
Practice Disseminated within Team 
P9b Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 276. 
25 Team 
Level of Transfer of Potential 
Knowledge to Usable Knowledge 
P10 
Potentially the same construct as construct 21. Do 
“transfer” and “transition” have the same meaning? 
26 Team Level of Transactive Memory P10 
Nature of transactive memory defined clearly on p. 
277. Level of transactive memory defined somewhat 
indirectly. 
27 Team 
Level of Transactive Memory 
Development 
P11a, P11b 
Nature of transactive memory development defined 
clearly on p. 277. Level of transactive memory 
development defined somewhat indirectly. 
28 Team Level of Virtual Work P11b 
Nature of virtual work defined clearly on pp. 267-268. 
Level of virtual work defined somewhat indirectly. 
Note that the level of virtual work seems to be an 
attribute of both team (P11b) and team member (P7) 
(see also line 19 in this table). 
29 Team 
Extent to Which Technologies of 
Organizational Systems are Used to 
Support Transactive Memory 
Development 
P11b Not defined clearly. 
30 Team Level of Synergy P12, P13 
Nature of synergy defined clearly on p. 278. Level of 
synergy defined somewhat indirectly. 
31 Team 
Degree of Match Between Team Task 
and Technology Use 
P13 Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 278. 
Note: “*” means it is unclear whether attribute in general belongs to the class “team” or “team member.” 
 
A second problem with the paper’s articulation of constructs (which is to some extent a corollary of 
the first problem) is that some are defined rigorously (e.g., the level of team virtualness and 
“individual knowledge types”) but others are not. Moreover, the meaning of some constructs has to be 
elicited from the text used to articulate and support the propositions. Sometimes the meaning of these 
constructs is clear; sometimes it is not. 
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For example, a construct used in Proposition 4b of the paper is “Level of Collective Knowledge 
Accessible Via Technological Tools.” Earlier in the paper (p. 273), collective knowledge is defined 
reasonably precisely as “explicit knowledge that has been internalized by the team members.” What 
is meant by “technological tools,” however, is discussed only somewhat obliquely. Nonetheless, it is 
not clear which of the following meanings should be ascribed to the construct used in Proposition 4b 
of the paper: (a) the nature of the collective knowledge formed by more-virtual teams means this 
knowledge is easier to access via “technological tools,” or (b) more-virtual teams have more access 
to or greater facility with “technological tools” and, thus, find it easier to access collective knowledge, 
or (c) both meanings apply to the construct. If the theory is to be rigorously operationalized and 
tested, the meaning of the construct must be clarified. 
 
Table 2 above contains my assessment of the extent to which each construct used in Griffith et al.’s 
(2003) paper has been defined rigorously. In part, some of the problems faced by Griffith et al. reflect 
more general problems faced by scholars who work in the knowledge-management area. For 
instance, whereas the meaning of constructs such as “amount” are straightforward in some domains 
(e.g., the amount of a good produced), they are problematic in the knowledge management domain. 
For example, what precisely is meant by the “amount of inflow of knowledge from both peer and 
supervising units” (Griffith et al., 2003, p. 274, my emphasis)? 
 
One approach Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper might have used to clarify the meaning of all constructs is 
to employ a table similar to Table 2 above. Such a table could have shown the class of things that 
underlie each construct (team or team member) and the attributes in general associated with each 
class of things. To the extent possible, the table also could have provided a rigorous definition of the 
construct. Where a rigorous definition for a construct was difficult to provide, the table could have 
been used to indicate that further work was needed to refine the meaning of the construct. Other 
scholars could then focus their work on articulating these constructs more clearly. 
 
The term “boundary” is not used within Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper. Nonetheless, at one point the 
paper indicates the theory is not applicable to all kinds of virtual teams: “[t]his model is presented 
from the perspective of virtual teams where membership is relatively stable, but with members having 
interaction both within the focal team, as well as with co-located others” (p. 269). Via this statement, 
therefore, Griffith et al. are seeking to be specific about the class of things that their theory covers. 
 
Use of the evaluation framework and criteria motivates considerations of whether the class of things 
covered by Griffith et al.’s theory needs to be defined more precisely. For example: Does the theory apply 
to all kinds of tasks a virtual team with a relatively stable membership might undertake? Does it apply when 
the virtual team is made of members having substantial differences in culture? Does it hold throughout all 
phases of the virtual team’s existence? Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper is silent on such questions. 
  
In the absence of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper having defined all constructs precisely, it is difficult to 
test their theory empirically. The reason is that valid and reliable measures cannot be devised for 
constructs that are not defined rigorously. Table 1 of their paper (p. 281) shows a number of 
constructs for which “[m]easures have to be developed,” but valid and reliable measures cannot be 
developed unless the meaning of each construct is clear. 
5.1.2. Associations 
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states 19 propositions. Nine manifest a single directional association 
between two constructs (five positive associations and four negative associations). Two (P5a and P7) 
manifest two mediated associations involving three constructs (one construct is associated with 
another construct that, in turn, is associated with another construct). Eight manifest moderated 
associations – in other words, the “strength” of the directional association between two constructs is 
moderated by a third construct. From an ontological perspective, all types of associations in Griffith et 
al.’s (2003) theory manifest a hypothesized interaction between the constructs involved in the 
association. In other words, they are postulating that the history of at least one of the constructs in the 
association is not independent of the history of the other construct(s) in the association. 
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The paper’s use of moderated associations strengthens the potential predictive and explanatory 
power of the theory that has been articulated. Moreover, while the paper does not use the terms 
“cause” and “causal” when discussing the propositions, nonetheless, causality is implied in the 
arguments provided to support many of the propositions. For example, it seems clear the authors 
believe the existence of virtuality in a team causes certain outcomes to occur in relation to how 
different types of knowledge are transferred among team members (but perhaps they have cautiously 
avoided use of causality terminology). To the extent the propositions imply causality either implicitly or 
explicitly, the predictive and explanatory power of their theory is enhanced further. 
 
Some of the arguments provided in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper to support a number of their 
associations are rigorous and compelling. For instance, their Proposition 1a states (p. 271): “More 
virtual teams are more likely to transform implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge than less virtual 
teams.” The constructs of “level of team virtualness,” “implicit knowledge,” and “explicit knowledge” 
are first defined carefully in the paper (pp. 267-271). Griffith et al. then provide compelling arguments 
(p. 271) to support an association among these constructs – for example, “[t]eams who spend less 
time together on task, are located further apart, and who make greater use of technological tools…will 
be more likely to transfer knowledge in explicit…forms because the technology supports the 
declarative nature of explicit knowledge.” They also cite earlier research to support their argument. 
 
Two factors undermine the rigor of arguments provided by Griffith et al. (2003), however, to support other 
associations. First, as discussed above, some constructs are not defined clearly. As a result, the meaning 
of any associations that employ these constructs will lack clarity in some respects. Second, because of the 
large number of constructs and associations employed in the theory, it is difficult to provide rigorous 
argumentation to support them all. Inevitably, some associations will be better argued than others. 
 
For instance, Proposition 5b in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states: “Access to and appropriation of tools 
and structures that support highly interdependent work will moderate this result on shared knowledge.” 
By “this result,” Griffith et al. mean their previous proposition (Proposition 5a), which states: “More virtual 
teams have a greater likelihood of enacting an independent approach to their tasks and, therefore, are 
expected to have less shared understanding of their tasks than less virtual teams.” 
 
In my view, the constructs in Proposition 5b called “Level of Access to Tools and Structures that 
Support Highly Interdependent Work” and “Level of Appropriation of Tools and Structures that 
Support Highly Interdependent Work” are not defined rigorously (see Table 2 above). What exactly is 
meant by “access”? What exactly is meant by “appropriation”? Are there trade-offs between “access” 
and “appropriation”? For example, what happens when teams have high levels of access to tools that 
support interdependent work but low levels of appropriation of these tools? Similarly, what happens 
when teams have low levels of access to tools that support interdependent work but high levels of 
appropriation of the tools that they can access? How is the extent to which tools support 
interdependent work to be assessed? Is this an attribute in particular of a tool that exists 
independently of humans? Or is this a “socially constructed” attribute in particular of a tool? Are 
shared understanding and shared knowledge the same constructs (see Table 2 above)? As the 
nuances in possible meaning of these constructs are teased out, the need for more careful 
argumentation to support both Propositions 5a and 5b in Griffith et al. (2003) becomes apparent. 
 
Because the paper does not specify all associations in the theory rigorously, a researcher’s ability to 
test the theory empirically is undermined. Researchers will lack the understanding they need to be 
able to evaluate whether the theory’s 19 propositions hold empirically when they observe the 
outcomes of a test of the theory. 
 
Moreover, the associations that underpin the nine directional and two mediated propositions in the theory 
are subject to the paradox articulated by Meehl (1967) – namely, stronger research designs will yield 
weaker tests of these associations (recall, the null hypothesis might be rejected because any covariation 
detected by stronger empirical tests might reflect ambient noise in the data or an association that is 
statistically significant but not practically significant). Ideally, Griffith et al. (2003) would have stated these 
associations in functional form or provided values that they deem to be practically significant in terms of 
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each association’s parameters (Edwards & Berry, 2010). However, the eight moderated associations in 
Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory provide more theoretical precision than their directional associations and, 
thus, allow stronger tests of their theory to be undertaken (Edwards & Berry, 2010). 
5.1.3. States 
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains only a limited and somewhat indirect description of those states 
that fall inside the boundary of their theory and those states that fall outside the boundary of their 
theory. For instance, in their discussion of the “virtualness” construct, they indicate that pure face-to-
face teams are unlikely to occur in today’s technological environment and that pure virtual teams 
(those that never meet face-to-face) differ in a “non-linear way” from teams where their members do 
meet (if only occasionally) (p. 268). Thus, their theory covers states that apply to “hybrid teams” only 
– those teams that do not have extreme values for the virtualness construct. 
 
If, as I have argued, Griffith et al.’s theory has 31 constructs (see Table 2), the state space that arises 
from the Cartesian product of the different sets of values that each of these constructs might assume 
will be very large (even with a restricted range of values for the “virtualness” construct). It is 
understandable, therefore, that Griffith et al. would have had difficulty crafting a narrative to describe 
precisely the subset of the conceivable state space covered by their theory. 
5.1.4. Events 
As with states, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains only a limited and somewhat indirect description 
of those events that are inside the boundary of their theory and those events that are outside the 
boundary of their theory. For instance, because their theory covers only a restricted range of values 
for the “virtualness” construct, the events that their theory covers will be limited to those associated 
with this restricted range of values for this construct (manifested in the before-state and after-state 
pairs that are used to describe an event). 
 
Nonetheless, the large conceivable state space associated with Griffith et al.’s theory leads to a large 
conceivable event space. As a result, it is understandable that Griffith et al. will have had difficulty 
crafting a narrative to describe the subset of the conceivable event space covered by their theory. 
5.2. Whole 
In this subsection, I evaluate the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper as a whole. The evaluation 
of the theory’s emergent attributes is more of an exercise in judgment than the evaluation of its parts.  
5.2.1. Importance 
The introduction of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper provides some clear and compelling reasons why the 
theory’s domain phenomena are important for practice. The paper points out that the management of 
teams and knowledge are important ways of creating “synergies in … resources” and “increased 
value” for organizations (p. 266). Moreover, with the emergence and ongoing refinement and 
development of collaboration technologies and the increasing globalization of workforces, virtual 
teams are becoming more prevalent. Thus, the successful operation of virtual teams is now critical to 
the success of many organizations (e.g., Lowry, Zhang, Zhou, & Fu, 2010). 
 
From a research perspective, the paper argues the theory proposed potentially provides a foundation 
for other researchers who wish “to identify the limiting conditions for effective learning and knowledge 
transfer across the range of traditional, hybrid, and virtual teams” (p. 280). This outcome clearly has 
been achieved, because Google Scholar™ shows Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has been cited more 
than 300 times. Many researchers have, thus, found the paper useful in their work. 
5.2.2. Novelty 
Prima facie, it does not appear Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has been paradigm changing in the sense 
it has fundamentally altered the ways researchers view phenomena associated with virtual teams and 
knowledge transfer. Thus, the paper follows a normal-science approach (Kuhn 1996). Nonetheless, 
the theory described in the paper can be deemed novel for several other reasons. 
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First, at the time Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper was published, the theory proposed included a number 
of constructs that, if not completely new, had received only cursory attention in the extant research 
literature. For example, Table 1 of the paper (p. 281) shows several constructs that require 
“measures to be developed.” Table 1 of the paper also contains a number of constructs that, to the 
best of my knowledge, had not been canvassed extensively by researchers (e.g., “level of social 
interaction limited by virtual work undertaken”). 
 
Second, the paper includes a number of associations that had received either no or only cursory attention in 
the research literature that existed at the time the paper was prepared. For example, based on the paper’s 
analysis of existing literature, the eight moderated associations proposed in the theory appear to be new. 
 
Third, the “package” of constructs and associations included in the theory was novel. While at the 
time the paper was published other researchers might have canvassed subsets of the constructs and 
associations covered by Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory, the “whole” was new. The theory covered team-
virtualness and knowledge-transfer phenomena in novel, interesting, and important ways. 
 
In the context of Locke and Golden-Biddle’s (1997) two strategies for demonstrating the contribution 
to knowledge of a piece of research, Griffith et al. (2003) first construct intertextual coherence using 
Locke and Golden-Biddle’s tactic of “synthesized coherence” – making connections between 
literatures that historically have been somewhat disjointed (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997, pp. 1030-
1035). Their paper enacts Locke and Golden-Biddle’s second strategy, problematizing the existing 
literature, by using the tactic of “incompleteness” – that is, showing the existing literature can be 
characterized by knowledge gaps or lacunae (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997, pp. 1030-1035). 
 
These tactics are manifested in the way the paper frames its contribution: “The model is largely drawn 
from the extant literature….Our contribution is in combining the results from the prior literature in a 
way that is amenable to an assessment of the opportunities and challenges presented by considering 
more and less virtual teams from the perspective of knowledge” (p. 270). In this light, Griffith et al.’s 
(2003) paper has tacitly followed Locke and Golden-Biddle’s recommendations for demonstrating 
novelty and contribution via the rhetoric used to contextualize a piece of research. As a result, overall, 
the paper’s rhetoric is engaging and compelling. 
5.2.3. Parsimony 
As I have indicated above, I believe the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains: 
 
• 31 constructs (rather than 17 constructs, as shown in Figure 2 of the paper, or 15 
constructs, as shown in Table 1 of the paper); 
 
• 21 associations (these are manifested in 19 propositions in the paper). 
 
Based on a simple count of the number of constructs and associations in the theory, it is difficult to 
conclude it is parsimonious. As a result, one might predict this lack of parsimony would undermine the 
theory’s impact on other researchers. Interestingly, as indicated above, citation data suggests 
otherwise. Given the large number of citations to Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper, the theory proposed in 
the paper clearly has engaged the interest of other researchers. Thus, contrary to expectations, lack 
of parsimony has not weakened its impact. 
 
Nonetheless, the large number of constructs and associations in Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory is likely 
to undermine any attempts made to “prune” it – that is, to reduce the number of constructs and 
associations and to articulate its inside-boundary states and inside-boundary events more precisely 
(Leavitt et al., 2010). For instance, what are the implications for the theory if an empirical test shows 
lack of support for one (or some subset) of its associations? Does “one null result or even a few null 
results…really justify moving backwards in the logical chain to argue the theory is disconfirmed”? 
(Leavitt et al., 2010, p. 646). Moreover, with so many constructs and associations, it will be difficult to 
find a comparable theory against which the predictive and explanatory power of the theory can be 
evaluated (Leavitt et al., 2010, pp. 649-654). 
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5.2.4. Level 
In my view, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has articulated a middle-range (meso) theory. The range of 
phenomena the theory covers is reasonably broad. Thus, the authors cannot be accused of narrow 
empiricism. Moreover, while a number of the constructs have yet to be defined rigorously and to be 
operationalized, it is possible to conceive how ultimately these outcomes might be achieved. In short, 
the theory is framed at a level that enables it to be employed to generate useful predictions about, 
insights about, and understanding of the theory’s focal phenomena. 
5.2.5. Falsifiability 
I have argued above that some parts of the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper have been 
articulated clearly and other parts have not been articulated clearly. Where clarity exists, rigorous 
empirical tests can be undertaken to test the theory. Potentially, the outcomes of such tests will lead 
researchers to conclude the theory is not supported (i.e., the theory can be falsified). For those parts of 
the theory that are not articulated clearly, however, attempts to falsify it are problematic. Empirical tests 
that produce “unfavorable” outcomes may simply mean researchers have used invalid or unreliable 
measures of constructs. Alternatively, they have failed to understand the nature of an association 
between constructs. They also might have tested the theory in a context that falls outside its boundary. 
5.3. Summary Evaluation 
Table 3 provides a summary of the more-detailed evaluation I have carried out above of Griffith et 
al.’s (2003) paper. 
 
Table 3. Summary Evaluation of Griffith et al.’s (2003) Paper 
Criterion Summary Evaluation 
Parts 
Constructs 
Some constructs are defined precisely; others are not. Inconsistencies exist among the 
definitions of some constructs at different places in the paper. Little discussion occurs on the 
boundary of the theory in terms of the class of classes of things it covers. A brief comment is 
made about the theory applying to virtual teams whose membership is relatively stable and 
whose members have both remote and local interactions. 
Associations 
Use of moderated associations strengthens the potential predictive and explanatory power of 
the paper. Some arguments used to support associations are rigorous and compelling. Others 
are not clear and compelling, because they include constructs that are not defined precisely. 
Moreover, the large number of constructs and associations employed makes rigorous 
articulation of all associations difficult to accomplish. 
States 
Little discussion occurs on those states that are inside the boundary of the theory and those 
that are outside the boundary of the theory. 
Events 
Little discussion occurs on those events that are inside the boundary of the theory and those 
that are outside the boundary of the theory. 
Whole 
Importance 
The paper provides clear and compelling reasons why the theory is important for practice. The 
paper is highly cited, which manifests its substantial impact on other researchers. 
Novelty 
The paper introduces new constructs and associations. It also covers team-virtualness and 
knowledge-transfer phenomena in novel, interesting, and important ways. The theory covers 
gaps or lacunae in the existing literature. 
Parsimony 
The theory is not parsimonious, because it has a large number of constructs and associations 
and also covers many possible states and events. 
Level The theory is framed at an appropriate level as a middle-range (meso) theory. 
Falsifiability 
Those parts of the theory that have been articulated precisely can be subjected to rigorous 
empirical tests. Thus, these parts potentially can be falsified. Those parts of the theory that 
have not been articulated rigorously, however, are difficult to test empirically. Thus, the 
outcomes of tests of these parts of the theory are problematic as a means of supporting or 
falsifying the theory. 
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6. Using the Framework and Criteria to Inform Theory 
Refinement and Construction 
The framework and criteria I have proposed can also be used to inform researchers seeking to refine 
an existing theory or to build a new theory. As they construct their modified or new theory, 
researchers should be mindful of matters they need to address from the perspective of achieving 
high-quality outcomes in relation to the parts and whole of their theory. In essence, the framework 
and criteria can be used to test the quality of the work they are undertaking as their refined or new 
theory unfolds. 
 
If researchers are seeking to refine an existing theory, the framework and criteria can first be used to 
pinpoint areas where the existing theory can be improved. Researchers’ analyses might indicate some 
constructs are not well defined, some associations are not articulated clearly, the inside-boundary states 
and events have not been specified clearly, the theory lacks parsimony, and the importance of the 
theory is not well argued. Researchers can then seek to rectify the problems they identify. 
 
For instance, my analysis of Griffith et al. (2003) using the framework highlights some areas where their 
theory might be improved. A number of their constructs and associations need to be defined more 
rigorously, and the inside-boundary states and events of their theory need to be articulated more clearly. 
Once these outcomes are achieved, it might be possible to see more clearly which constructs and 
associations should be discarded from the theory because they are deemed not to be material in 
explaining and predicting variations in the theory’s focal phenomena (usable team knowledge). As a 
result, a more parsimonious version of the theory might be achieved. Moreover, a more rigorous 
specification of constructs, associations, and inside-boundary states and events would facilitate more 
rigorous empirical tests of the theory and, thus, an enhanced ability to falsify the theory. 
 
If certain types of defects become apparent, however, researchers need to reflect carefully on the 
merits of seeking to enhance the theory. For example, if the theory’s importance or novelty are 
unclear, or it has been framed at an inappropriate level, researchers should be circumspect about 
whether actions -- such as defining constructs more rigorously, providing a clearer rationale for 
associations, and articulating inside-boundary states and events more completely -- will produce 
substantial improvements in the quality of the theory. 
 
For example, my analysis of Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory using the framework I have proposed shows 
that it rates highly in terms of importance, novelty, and level. In this light, prima facie good reasons 
exist to try to refine or enhance the theory rather than build yet another theory of virtual teams and 
knowledge-transfer phenomena (Gray & Cooper, 2010; Hambrick, 2007). My analysis using the 
framework pinpoints some ways in which an enhanced theory might be achieved. 
 
If researchers are seeking to articulate a new theory, their first concern should be the choice of the 
focal phenomena. They must select focal phenomena that their colleagues ultimately will deem to be 
important, either because the focal phenomena’s importance is readily apparent, or the rhetoric the 
researchers provide to support the importance of the focal phenomena is compelling. Sometimes a 
key issue is to reframe well-known phenomena in new, interesting ways or to point out important 
phenomena that previously had gone unseen (Weber, 2003a). The focal phenomena must also be 
conceived at a level that allows a meso-level theory to be formulated. 
 
Once the focal phenomena are defined clearly, researchers can then build the parts of the theory – 
constructs, associations, inside-boundary states, and inside-boundary events. They can seek to 
ensure the theory is falsifiable through clear, precise definitions or specification of the theory’s parts. 
Through selective choice of constructs, associations, and inside-boundary states and events, they 
can also seek to ensure the theory is parsimonious. They must then realistically evaluate their 
theory’s “utility” and “originality” (Corley & Gioia, 2011). If they deem it to be useful and novel, they 
must carefully craft their rhetoric with the objective of convincing their colleagues that their theory has 
these characteristics (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997). 
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7. Conclusions 
The framework I have proposed above facilitates an evaluation of the quality of an existing theory. It 
also informs researchers who are seeking to build a new theory or refine an existing theory. As they 
construct their new or modified theory, they should be mindful of matters they need to address from 
the perspective of achieving high-quality outcomes in relation to their theory’s parts and whole. In 
essence, the framework and criteria can be used as a set of checkpoints to test the quality of the 
work they are undertaking. 
 
The framework does not assist, however, in choosing the focal phenomena and the ways these 
phenomena might be conceived, nor does it assist in choosing a theory’s constructs, associations, 
and inside-boundary states and events. To a large extent, these choices remain creative acts that 
affect, in particular, the quality of the whole – a theory’s importance, its novelty, its parsimony, and so 
on (Feyerabend, 1975; Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 39-73; Weick, 1989). In the information systems 
discipline (and in a number of other disciplines), I believe a rich vein of research lies in seeking to 
better understand the characteristics of those choices that lead to the articulation of high-quality, high-
impact theories. 
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